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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

KUWAIT OIL EXPLORATION IN ECUADOR--The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) is to set up a joint oil exploration venture in Ecuador later this year in a further move to diversify its activities abroad. Reports from Quito indicate that plans for the project will not be implemented until the legislature in Ecuador approves new regulations on operations by foreign companies. The regulations are to be agreed by the Ecuadorian Congress by the end of this year. The joint venture will be among the first undertaken by an Arab oil state in Latin America. Earlier this year, KPC set up two similar joint ventures with Pacific Resources of Hawaii and AZL Resources of the US (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, June 22 and May 4). According to Ecuadorian Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Cesar Robalino, the plans for the joint venture were examined earlier this year during discussions with Kuwait's Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabbah. One of the smaller members of OPEC, Ecuador averaged a daily output of 220,000 b/d last year, but with local consumption rising at a faster rate than production, the country must step up exploration if it is to remain an oil exporter. According to Mr Robalino, drilling by the Ecuador state oil company, CEPE, has been held up by a shortage of drilling rigs. CEPE has announced that during the first six months of this year nine wells have been drilled with 16 more scheduled for drilling by the end of 1981. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 10]

CSO: 4300

AMF TO DOUBLE CAPITAL BY THE END OF 1981

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 7

[Text]

The Abu-Dhabi based Arab Monetary Fund is to almost double its capital to \$900 million within the next six months, officials of the Fund were quoted as saying last week. The AMF is the Arab equivalent of the International Monetary Fund, and lends mainly to countries with balance of payments problems.

The Fund's authorised capital is now Arab Accounting Dinars 263 million (\$890 million), but only 52 per cent of this amount has been paid up. One AAD is equivalent to about three IMF Special Drawing Rights, the IMF's currency, which is worth approximately \$1.33.

According to officials of the Fund, loans committed by the AMF are expected to amount to its paid-up capital in about two weeks' time. This will trigger an automatic call on member-states to pay in the remainder of their contributions to the authorised capital. Under a board decision taken in April, member-states have six months to pay up the remainder of their contribution after the call on capital is made.

By the middle of this month, loans approved by the AMF, one of the smaller Arab-dominated funds, are expected to reach about AAD 70 million (\$237 million).

Loans committed last year amounted to AAD \$35 million (\$118.5 million).

However, AMF officials expect the Fund to play a much larger role in the Arab world in the future, as the AMF's capital increase takes effect in the next six months. The Fund does not directly finance development programmes, as do the major Arab-dominated lenders such as the Islamic Development Bank and the OPEC Fund for International Development.

Nonetheless, as an Arab League institution, created in 1977, the AMF seeks to promote closer economic and monetary ties in the Arab world, mainly through lending to correct economic imbalances such as deficits of trade.

Among projects now being considered by the AMF is a basket of currencies akin to the one used by the IMF to calculate the value of the SDR. So far, the AAD is not a real currency of exchange and its value is based on that of the IMF's currency.

Also under consideration, AMF officials said recently, are a central system for clearing payments between member-states and ways to make the AAD an effective monetary instrument in transactions between Arab countries.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

KUWAIT FIRM WINS IRAQI CONTRACT--The Fiafi Trading and Contracting Company of Kuwait has secured the biggest foreign contract ever to be won by a Kuwaiti company, with a \$210 million order from the Iraqi Defence Ministry. The contract is for the construction of a group of buildings for the ministry of Baghdad. At about the same time as the deal was announced, Fiafi and the Kuwait-based Indian construction IOCC were reported to have signed an agreement directly related to the Iraqi contract. The agreement is understood to cover the provision of management services, technical cooperation and help with construction by the IOCC to Fiafi. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT AND MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 11]

CSO: 4300

GULF INVESTMENT AGENCY WOULD BRING BENEFITS TO AREA COUNTRIES

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 23 June 81 p 7

[Article by D. Ahmad al-Bar: "Gulf Investment Agency: A Step To Steer Arab Funds Toward Productivity and Foster Growth in Developing Countries"]

[Text] A meeting of Gulf countries' finance ministers may soon take place in Kuwait to debate the issue of setting up a Gulf investment agency. The Gulf Cooperation Council gave preliminary approval to the proposed project during its last meeting in Abu Dhabi.

An organization such as this may be looked upon as a serious venture toward attaining economic unity in the Gulf region. It may also serve to crystallize the region's unitary investment policy which, as is known, is one of the structural pillars of a comprehensive economy. The Gulf countries are seeking not only a unitary investment policy; their goal is to earn greater profits from cash assets and increasing oil revenues than otherwise earned by each country individually.

Because of the banking system in the Gulf countries specifically, and in the Arab world generally, and because of the almost absent financial markets and Arab expertise, a large part of cash assets and oil revenues have been placed in short-term deposits in the United States, Europe and Japan.

In the past few years, the Gulf countries have been diversifying their foreign investments. Some of their assets have been invested in the purchase of real estate, others have been placed in corporate stock ownership and in co-sponsoring projects with advanced capitalist and developing countries. To sink their funds, they have also set up interbanking systems such as--and we mention just a few--EUPAF, the Arab European Bank, the Arab French Bank, etc. Besides commercial investments, the Gulf countries have subsidized funds designated for national and regional growth to encourage their participation in Arab and simultaneously in Third World development projects.

Investments such as these absorb only a small portion of Arab Gulf funds. The larger portion, estimated at \$80 billion, are deposited in American and European banks which in turn invest them in developing countries at exorbitant interest rates and on specified terms. As a matter of fact, Arab assets have played a major role in financing foreign trade and other ventures for the developing countries. In 1970, Arab loans totaled \$3 billion; in 1979 they reached approximately \$17

billion. Due to high interest rates, developing countries have been forced, year after year, into the European and American financial markets to defray the cost of increased debts resulting from high interest and to finance a part of their projects. This situation had led the developing countries to be heavily indebted to financial institutions around the world.

A report on growth and cooperatives published in 1980 by the agency on cooperatives and economic development indicated that debt obligations owed to Western financial institutions by developing countries had risen from \$16 billion in 1970 to \$175 billion in 1980. The report also indicated that future debt obligations resulting from mounting interest rates would soon exceed their loan entitlements from Western financial markets.

Establishing a Gulf investment agency has been a logical step toward productively investing Arab funds in Arab countries and in developing countries that maintain strong ties with the region, rather than resorting to intermediaries whose sole aim is to reap unjustifiably high interest rates. In accordance with a studied plan, a part of the Gulf investment agency's funds will be placed in the agricultural sector, thus securing food supplies for Third World countries. Other investments will be steered toward certain industries that have thus far been unable to attract funding from banks that tend to seek possibilities for short-term gains regardless of the extreme importance these projects represent for the economy of these countries. It has been proven that Western commercial banks rarely invest in long-term productive ventures; rather, they concentrate on short-term, high-interest gains.

Such an agency for international growth will lead to the creation of a nucleus of financial experts complementing the already existing cadres now prominent in world finance.

This agency will gradually receive funding allocations from the various Gulf countries. In addition, finance ministers will soon set forth the regulations and procedures necessary to set up specialized investment firms to lure individual investments away from foreign banks and to attract those individuals who abstain from dealing with high interest rate banks. Thus, they will channel investments into Gulf resources and subsequently reinforce agricultural and industrial growth in the area. Far greater profits will be earned than otherwise obtained through deposits at foreign banks.

9770

CSO: 4303/58

TUDEH OPPONENTS WANT PARTY LEADER TRIED

Tehran JAVANAN-E EMRUZ in Persian No 753 20 Jul 81 pp 10, 12

[Report on Tudeh Party First Secretary Nureddin Kianuri]

Reminder

[Excerpt] Following the open debate between JAVANAN and Kianuri of the Tudeh Party of Iran, a representative of an opposing faction, called "Nobakht", called at the office of this magazine and offered some explanation on the issue.

He said the monthly, the proletarian MARDOM was the mouthpiece of his faction and put forth certain statements in connection with the core and the secretary-general of the Party which, in summation, pointed to the incompetence and even treason of Kianuri vis-a-vis the Marxist Tudeh Party. Moreover, he called for the purge of Kianuri's gang from the Party.

The Party and Kianuri responded to this view by decrying Nobakht as a renegade and an undesirable person to the Party.

As we said earlier, the faction opposing Kianuri have sent in certain remarks as the continuation of their earlier remarks and in connection with the response by the Tudeh Party. We bring the first part of these remarks to the attention of our dear readers in this issue, but before doing so, the mention of a number of points is in order here:

1. The faction opposing Kianuri has called for the formation of an open court in order to illumine and prove the charges brought against him in relation to the murder of his party comrades. JAVANAN, also, announces that it is ready to print the evidences and arguments of both sides if such a trial takes place. Thus, the two parties come face to face and we shall remain a neutral observer on behalf of our readers until such a time when the truth of the matter is made evident.

2. The faction opposing Kianuri has, inter alia, brought up the issue of the government's compromise with Kianuri several

times during the course of its arguments. With a view to the background of the Tudeh Party in Iran and in its political currents, we believe this to be a controversy. The Iranian nation knows best who stands to gain from this controversy. As the responsible officials of the country have announced on several occasions, they are in no mood to compromise with the Tudeh Party. On the contrary, they have many times tried to avoid the attitude which might induce a repetition of past incidents. Any clearer evidence of this fact than the statement of Mr Jannati, member of the Guardian Council, in connection with the presidential elections, to the effect that being a member of the Tudeh Party is a negative point and a liability?

3. To prove its points and point out the observation of the rule of courtesy on the part of the leadership of the Party, the opposition faction has sometimes employed words which we quote ipso facto so that there may not be any censorship at work--just as it has never been. We apologize to our dear readers on this score.

We hope that these series of debates and the advancement of new issues may prove a positive step in the direction of revealing the facts and illuminating the contrast between the profiles of righteousness and falsehood, and of sincerity and duplicity. We look forward to receiving your suggestions.

We already knew that Kianuri has engaged in a conspiracy of silence in the monthly, proletarian MARDOM. Therefore, it seemed likely to us that he would continue this conspiracy and sidestep the issues brought up in the interview. However, we had foreseen in that introduction that Kianuri could not carry on like this forever. We did not expect our forecast to come true so quickly. Now that this prophecy has been realized like the other prophecies made in the monthly, proletarian MARDOM, we leave behind, untouched, the passages about this prophecy in the already published introduction as well as the other parts of the article as we move on to conclude with a response to the "replies" by Kianuri.

But, now long can Kianuri and his gang continue their conspiracy of silence depends to a considerable extent on the support given us by the truth-seeking and right-minded compatriots and also on the re-echoing of our words by the truly (not speciously) progressive and revolutionary publications, press and mass media that want the facts to come to light. In our opinion, all the members of the press that have refrained from reaching our righteous voice to the ears of the honorable and revolutionary people of Iran (particularly the publications of the "leftist" groups who we are sure are invariably aware of the existence of the monthly proletarian MARDOM, but out of political envy keep silent for fear of our gaining "strength") are colluding with Kianuri in his conspiracy of silence against us. Likewise, the government and the ministry who, despite a lapse of two years, have not responded positively to our legitimate request for securing a license to freely publish the monthly, proletarian MARDOM, are in fact abetting Kianuri and aiding the

broadening of his treachery. The Iranian nation is right in viewing their attacks on Kianuri as sham quarrel.

The foregoing notwithstanding, we firmly believe that Kianuri cannot keep up his conspiracy of silence for more than one or two more years--assuming that he still remains in his position. Because the blows of the hammer of time and the hardheaded facts will either force him to adopt a definite stance or will crush his stony skull--in which no thought other than skullduggery, conspiracy and treachery transpires--so smashingly that he will not even have a change to give a cry of "ouch"!

What picture takes shape now before our eyes is that of Kianuri and his associates who have risen to the apex of power and position (and we promise the Iranian nation that their rise will be arrested at this level) and at the same time plummeted into the bottom of the trashbin of history. Any patriotic Iranian who is alert and able to see the truth and penetrate into the core of the phenomena can easily see the rascalities of Kianuri and his gang and at the same time sound the depths of their abjectness, wretchedness and meanness. He can see well that anywhere they turn they get a smack on the head. May these sobering lessons of history sober our revolutionary and evolutionary generation into wide awakening and bring to self-consciousness those who simple-mindedly and in futility are sinking to the bottom in their scramble for achieving a rapid grip at the levers of power.

Is Kianuri Sincere In His Patronage of the Islamic Republic?

In his interview with JAVANAN-E EMRUZ, Kianuri says that if the Party Congress is not disrupted by an attack by club-wielders he calls it to convene within 24 hours. Elsewhere (in his recent TV debate) he said that his Party is open to Moslems and that many Moslems are its members and that this does not give rise to any problem.

There are, of course, ample evidence to prove the duplicity and falsity of his and that of his gang's advocacy of the Islamic Republic regime. But we suffice our argument to the examination and analysis of his two recent statements which are known to all and sundry.

As far as the convening of the Congress is concerned, Kianuri has for the first time shown his hand and revealed that he is strongly against the holding of the Congress. The more or less old members of the Party are well aware, of course in private, that Kianuri has never been in favor of the holding of the Congress and he is not for it now, either. This is because the convening of the Congress would spell the death of Kianuri and his associates (if not physically, at least politically, for sure). We think one example would be sufficient to prove this point.

About two years before the Bahman [February] Revolution, Kiumars Zarshenas (the dubious member of the Central Committee of the Party and the Secretary-General of the Youths Organization of the Party), visited the writer's house along with another responsible officer of the Party. We had some limited discussion about party matters. After the departure of that comrade, the discussion between Zarshenas and the writer expanded and covered the more important party matters. During the discussion he explained the reason for the non-convention of the congress (which, in accordance with the decision of the Fourth Plenum--the extensive plenary session

--of the Party had to be held even in clandestine conditions). He said that the members of the Central Committee prevented the holding of the congress as a result of internal differences among themselves.

Let us now revert to Kianuri's claim which was quoted above.

Firstly, any party member or any person for that matter, who had read the complete proceedings of the Fourth Plenum and the draft of the Constitution (of the Party) before it was forged (by Kianuri), knows that in accordance with the contents of these documents, the Central Committee of the Party is duty-bound to hold the congress (or at least its extraordinary session) even in clandestine conditions. This has been done by other communist parties (including Lenin's party before the October Revolution) in conditions by far more stringent than those experienced by our party, and they have always been successful. So, if the gentlemen who are our leaders are not up to this task, it should frankly be said that they are very incompetent and inadequate. Therefore, they should shut up and refrain from boasting right and left about having "adequate experience" and "a background of forty years of revolutionary struggle".

Secondly, when Kianuri claims that he will hold the Party Congress inside 24 hours if only the club-wielders do not stop him, it must be said that it can firstly be assumed that we are still (or again) in conditions of underground struggle and that according to the decisions adopted by the Fourth Plenum and in accordance with the tradition of all the communist and workers' parties in the world we can and should form the congress so that the party does not become stagnant like a quagmire (as it has).

Thirdly, if it is true that the congress can be called within 24 hours, why Kianuri did not call the congress to convene sometime during the first three months of the revolution--the period which was 90 times the length of 24 hours!--when there was no trace of any club-wielders and one dare say that the said period was the freest days of our history up to the time of this writing? If the claim of a 24-hour call was a bluff, then it is yet another proof of Kienuri's mendacity and charlatanism. If his claim is true, then the person who has missed 90 golden chances of 24-hours calls for the convention of the Congress cannot be called anything but a traitor. And this negligence has taken place in circumstances in which the holding of the congress has become one of the most crucial and imperative necessities for our party--a matter of prime importance.

Fourthly, the question we pose is if the repetitious claim by Kinauri and his associates is out of sincerity--which implies that they consider the present government one of the "revolutionary democrats", then what is the meaning of this excuse about the fear of club-wielders preventing the holding of the congress? It is here that the falsity of the pretense of Kinauri's outward advocacy of the Islamic Republic is exposed. This indicates that despite his foxiness, Kianuri has failed to conceal his faithlessness and disbelief in this government, because it is quite clear that if he considers club-wielding as a characteristic of this regime, then it means he does not believe in its being neither a revolutionary nor a democratic regime. If he associates this regime with the club-wielders, he is at least questioning the revolutionary quality of the regime, because a characteristic of a

revolutionary regime it is to confront decisively and in a revolutionary manner the unhealthy phenomena (such as club-wielding) and remove them immediately. Therefore, if a regime is a democratic one but remains silent in the face of violent phenomena, then it is not a regime of "revolutionary democrats" but in that case an attribute such as "pacifist democrats" would be more befitting it. These are not the kind of matters which are unknown to anybody. Therefore, if there is somebody who does not know these, then he cannot be accepted as a "leader".

9695

CSO: 4640/65

IRAN

BRIEFS

TRAINING FOR AFGHANS--More than 10,000 Afghans have been trained to serve with the revolutionary guards in Iran, according to reports from Tehran. They have been trained by Iranian and Pakistanian experts. Some have been serving at the crucial northern end of the war front, but others are being sent to areas where ethnic minorities are active. Around 4,000, it is said, are being sent to Baluchestan, where daylight attacks on revolutionary guards and other installations in recent weeks have reflected the defensive stance of the government forces. The training of the Afghans is said to have been carried out with their traditional brutality in mind and it is feared they will give no quarter when in action, dissident sources say. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

WIDESPREAD POWER, WATER CUTS--The Tehran government has announced a 56 billion rial fund to provide loans for tribal groups in Iran as an apparent move to try to reduce the unrest in the tribal areas. The money will be paid through agricultural cooperatives. As water and electricity cuts become more widespread the Ministry of Energy in Tehran has announced it intends to call in private contractors to help improve supplies. It announced new projects to this end while appealing to the public to restrict its use of water to the minimum to help the situation. Tehran radio announced water supplies would be cut off for a period of eight hours the following day in four areas of the capital. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

AMINI URGES OPPOSITION--Veteran former statesman Ali Amini in Paris, commenting on the presidential elections in Iran, said the boycott of the polls by nationalist and patriotic statesman had shown the ballot boxes were in fact only "conjuror's boxes." He called on Iranians to continue their struggle against Khomeini saying the world was now watching the situation in Iran. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

ASKS FOR OIL REVENUE PAYMENT--Writing in the Paris-based Iran-va-Jahan newspaper economist Reza Alavi said each Iranian should have received around \$125 dollars annually, based on the oil revenues under the previous regime, but this had been "stolen" by former governments who were not true representatives of the people. He urged that the first task of any new government should be ensure every Iranian received around that sum, based on oil revenues of \$12.5 billion a year. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

TERRORIST ATTACKS--Intelligence sources say Madrid, the Spanish capital, is now the pivotal centre for organisation of terrorist attacks by Libyan, Iranian and Syrian government-backed groups. The good relations Spain has cultivated with the Arab world have made this feasible, they say. The recent murder of PLO representative in Brussels Naim Khader, considered a "moderate," was carried out by Libyan agents based in Madrid, the sources added. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

SPECULATION OVER SE'ADATI--Iran watchers were divided over the significance of the execution of Reza Se'adati, the Mojahedin leader who was killed in Evin prison. Some thought this marked the opening of a new campaign against the leftist groups. Others, however, said it could have been a response to the Soviet shooting down of an aircraft leaving Iran. A renewed anti-Soviet campaign by the Iranian regime, if launched, could confirm the latter view, they said. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

CSO: 4600

KURDISH LEADER TALABANI INTERVIEWED

Stockholm RIZGARIYA KURDISTAN in Turkish Jun 81 pp 14-18, 30

[Interview with Kurdish Patriotic Union Secretary General Jalal Talabani; place and date of interview not given.]

[Text] [Question] As known, organization is of great importance in national liberation movements and in political struggle in general. Organizations appeared in various places in the Kurdish national resistance which lasted from the 1920's until 1938, that is, until it was crushed in the Dersim uprising. The most important of these organizations was the Kurdistan Emancipation Organization, which was of note especially in the Sheikh Sait resistance. We know that this organization, known to have been founded under the leadership of Jibranli Halit, was the first serious Kurdish organization. It is also necessary to mention the HOYBUN [expansion unknown] organization. We know that it was organized through the efforts of Jaladet Bedirkhan and was active in the Agri uprising.

What was the role of these political organizations, usually founded by Kurdish intellectuals, in the resistance movements? Were they effective?

[Answer] Concretely, we do not see that these organizations were all that effective in the Kurdish movements. These organizations tended to be a collection of intellectuals, who came from the nobility and prominent families, and of the aghas and chieftains themselves. The founders of these organizations usually came from the prominent families. They usually tried to combine the situation existing in Kurdistan at that time with the new thoughts which were developing. The innovative aspects did not carry much weight because they were defending their own status in Kurdistan as a class. The class configurations of that time were already outmoded. And certainly there were men from among the people within these organizations and they were effective to an extent. For example, Menduh Mithat, Kadri Jan and Jigherkhwin were among the men in this category.

However, the policies they followed and their class status prevented these organizations from being representative of the masses. They could not lead the masses. They could not organize the masses according to the needs of their own organizations. Therefore, their effectiveness was limited.

Their most important aspect was that they brought the concept of political organization to the Kurdish movements. They demonstrated the need for organization. As I pointed out, however, it cannot be said that these organizations were successful because of their class status and their inability to become a mass party.

[Question] What were these organizations' demands? What did they want? Did they have political programs? What was the framework of these programs?

[Answer] As far as I can tell, they did have programs.

HOYBUN especially had a defined program. It was published in a book entitled "The Kurdish Problem." The program called for the liberation of Kurdistan. It called for language and cultural freedom. However, this program and its demands had no special aspects. It did not include such matters as what the social order in Kurdistan should be, equality for women, what kind of course to set the social structure in Kurdistan on as a class matter and so forth. Only the liberation of Kurdistan (rather abstractly) was shown (demanded).

[Question] Okay, what lessons should be learned from these Kurdish national movements? What lessons do these movements contain for the armed struggles of today and the future?

[Answer] What we get from these movements, briefly, is this:

1. Kurdish aghas and chieftains cannot provide leadership for Kurdish national liberation movements. The Kurdish movement cannot succeed under the leadership of individuals and strata which attempt to lead, being content with only a few advantages which the social structure provides.
2. Imperialism and the states which divided Kurdistan up among themselves cannot be the friend of the Kurdish people. The history of Kurdistan shows us this in a very concrete way. They are the enemies of the Kurdish people.
3. Kurdish aghas, chieftains and rulers who are linked to the outside and are in the service of foreign enemies must be considered enemies. They have no connection at all with the Kurdish people and the struggle in Kurdistan, because they are committed to the enemy and serve the plans of the enemy. They are traitors to the Kurdish people and take their place in opposition to the struggle.
4. We have to recognize our friends and enemies well. It is very important from the standpoint of the fate of the struggle to be able to see concretely who is our friend and who is our enemy. Strong friendly relations must be developed with friends. Strong boundaries must be drawn between friends and enemies.
5. We must distinguish carefully between the states which divided Kurdistan among themselves (such as Turkey, Iran and Iraq) and the people of those nations. A state and the people of that nation are not the same thing. The states are our enemies and the people are our friends.
6. The leadership of a progressive, revolutionary party is necessary for the success of the Kurdish people's struggle. It becomes very difficult without such leadership. Old mistakes are repeated. Unity of the patriotic, progressive forces of Kurdistan is also necessary. Unity of the "peshmerge" which are equipped with new methods of people's warfare and conduct partisan warfare is necessary, too.

It is very important to be alert to imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism. Imperialism and imperialists are definitely enemies of the Kurdish people. It is

necessary not to be deceived by them. Now as before, we must not give them the chance to deceive us. We must be able to see through their ploys.

The lessons we must learn are briefly these. I discussed all of them at length in the book I wrote. If you ever have a chance to read the book, you will see all of them taken up in greater depth.

[Question] Let us ask a question also about the Mahabad Kurdish Republic. What has the Mahabad Kurdish Republic done for the Kurdish movement? What has the Kurdish movement gained by the Mahabad Kurdish Republic?

[Answer] In discussing this topic, it is necessary to mention KOMELA, the Komela Jinawey Kurd (Kurdish Renaissance Organization). This organization constitutes the first example of a serious organization in the history of Kurdistan. It is the first organization composed of Kurdish petite bourgeoisie. Until the founding of this organization, as I said before, it was the Kurdish elite which led the movements and organizing in Kurdistan. There was also a similar organization founded in Iraqi Kurdistan named HEWA (Hope). HEWA was made up of the same class levels, but it was rather reactionary. It was too nationalistic. Komela, however, was both nationalistic and leftist. Most of its founders and members were students. It was the representative of the petite bourgeoisie and its programs were national and democratic.

The second thing about KOMELA was that it took concrete steps against the Kurdish aghas and chieftains. Articles were written, poems were recited and efforts were made to act sensibly in practice. A third feature was that for the first time in the history of Kurdistan an organization established a trend toward the friends of Kurdistan. It established relations with the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the world. It established relations with other progressive powers. Alone of all the Kurdish organizations, including HEWA, up to that time, it was able to see the Western world for what it is, an imperialist camp. The dominant trend was to establish relations with them. KOMELA was the first Kurdish organization to break this trend. KOMELA also carried the struggle of the Kurdish people to the villages. It organized in the villages and enlightened the villagers. Another important feature of KOMELA bearing attention is that it was for Kurdistan. That is, one of KOMELA's most important features was that it worked to bring about an organization and to organize the struggle in all parts for all of Kurdistan, not just for Iranian Kurdistan. KOMELA had a section in Iraqi Kurdistan and worked to organize in Turkish Kurdistan through Ali Ghazi. It had relations with Syrian Kurdistan, mostly with Kadri Jan. It is rather necessary to see the problem as a whole and act accordingly, and KOMELA did this.

These things are the most important legacy and therefore lessons that KOMELA left to the Kurdish movement.

[Question] This information about KOMELA is important. This information is needed in order to understand the Mahabad Kurdish Republic in the course of history? So, was the Mahabad Kurdish Republic founded by KOMELA? How much was the Soviet Union influential in the formation of the Republic? What was the effect of the Azerbaijan People's Republic? What is the Republic's contribution to Kurdish history and the struggle?

[Answer] My approach to this period of the history of Kurdistan is somewhat different from my approach up to this time. What I say and write on this topic, as I see it, is different from the others.

In my opinion, KOMELA's failure to preserve the structure we just discussed and bringing in Ghazi Muhammed to head it had a negative effect on development. This incident was the beginning of a period of regression. KOMELA was an organization of the petite bourgeoisie, as I said. It had a rather radical and political stance. The Soviet Union intended to help it develop, to bring it to a more advanced position and give it a revolutionary structure. Relations were close for this reason. Bringing in Ghazi Muhammed at the head, however, did not go along with this line. Certainly Ghazi Muhammed was a valuable person, but he was a person of social stature. He was a religious man, a landowner. Ghazi Muhammed was brought in to head KOMELA in order to convert it into a party (the Kurdistan Democratic Party), but instead of establishing strong and continuous dialogues with the cadres, his headquarters adopted an attitude downplaying their importance.

The aghas and the sheikhs, with whom there had been no organized relations to that date, were brought to the head of the party and it was they who formed the government.

I published in my book the lists of the central committees in the periods when KOMELA and Ghazi Muhammed were dominant. Looking at the class and social structures of these two central committees, one immediately notices great differences. KOMELA's central committee was made up largely of tradesmen, peasants, students and intellectuals, that is, people rooted in the petite bourgeoisie. In contrast, the people on the central committee in Ghazi Muhammed's time were the rulers of that time. They were many aghas, sheiks and mullahs. This situation showed that the Kurdish movement had again come under the monopoly of the ruling classes. This monopoly of the elite had been broken in the KOMELA period. The monopoly of the Kurdish rulers in Iraqi Kurdistan had also been broken. The movement there was under the leadership of RIZGARI [Kurdish Liberation Party] and the Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party. This had been an important development for the movement in Kurdistan, but it did not last. The Kurdish movement again came under the control of the Kurdish elite. The formation of the Kurdish Democratic Party in the way I explained and the Republic's having almost the same character must be interpreted as a return to the old line from the standpoint of the Kurdish movement. And this situation had a direct effect on the other parts of Kurdistan.

The effect on Iraqi Kurdistan, in particular, was immediate. The party removed its leaders, and when Mullah Mustafa Barzani returned, control of the movement passed to him. He lost no time in surrounding himself with the elite of Iraqi Kurdistan. Shiekh Latif, who was elected vice president, was the biggest land holder in the Suleymaniyah region. Another was Shiekh Ziyad Muhammed, who was the biggest landlord in Erbil. So once more the Kurdish movement came under the leadership of the aghas and shiekh. And this was a step backwards.

Besides this, the Mahabad Kurdish Republic and the events which followed it certainly had a lot of positive effects also. It is necessary for us to see these positive aspects as well as the negative aspects. For one, the Mahabad Kurdish Republic was the first republic in Kurdish history. This is very important. Also

for the first time in the history of Kurdistan a political party gained ascendancy. The model of the Kurdistan Democratic Party was a first. It is even more important that it was democratic (within the confines I explained). The emergency of democracy next to nationalism is not something to be belittled. Again for the first time the movement in Kurdistan attracted the interest of a Socialist state. Friendly relations were established between the Kurds and the Soviet Union. Launching a campaign for Kurdish-language literacy, publication of the KURDISTAN newspaper and the rise of intensive awareness throughout Kurdistan, all such things had advantages.

However, the situation would most likely have been quite different if the Kurdish Republic had been formed under KOMELA's leadership, because the Kurds were defenseless when the Iranian state attacked. Ghazi Muhammed did not opt for resistance. He was just as guileless as Mullah Mustafa in 1975. But with this difference: he stayed in his country among his people, defending his ideas to the end, not quailing in the face of death. These are not little things.

[Question] What caused the fall of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic? Was it the effect of the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences which were taking place at that time? What was imperialism's place? What was the Soviet Union's attitude?

[Answer] In my view, what was most important in the fall of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic, along with the class and social positions of the forces at its head, was the social structure of that day. History has proved to us many times that backward and outmoded ruling classes can never succeed. We were just discussing the position of the forces which led the Republic. In this situation, it was rather difficult for the Republic to survive those hardships. The forces we discussed were not leaders for hard times. To see difficult times and hardships through was like something impossible from their standpoint. These were the reasons for the surrender to the Iranian army. The possibility of any other alternative was not even considered.

It is especially necessary not to forget the social structure of that time.

[Political] awareness in the structure of that time was inadequate. Modern classes had not yet been formed, intellectuals were extremely few. The social conditions to support a republic did not exist.

On the other hand, world conditions were also against the Kurds. American and British imperialism helped Iran against the republic in Kurdistan. The Soviet Union also pursued an erroneous policy. Instead of helping the Kurdish and Azerbaijani republics, it reduced relations with them to a minimum. It ignored the destruction of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic and the Azerbaijani People's Republic by the Iranian state.

There is an important lesson that we must learn here: not to rely on the outside. Not even to rely on an outside socialist nation. It is extremely important for the Kurdish movement to be independent. The Soviet example shows this concretely. The Soviet Union was the only bastion of world socialism under the circumstances of that time. It represented world socialism. It had a tremendous opportunity. It had great influence in the world. Despite this, when it changes its policy for

various reasons, it went back on helping the Kurds and the Azerbaijanis. This is why it is important to be able to be independent.

Second, there is a need for the leadership of a progressive, revolutionary organization. Our leaders must not be individuals, our leaders must be organizations. The influence of individuals persists even today. Unfortunately, this situation reflects on our organization. The Yekitiye Nistimane Kurdistan (Kurdistan Patriotic Union) must supercede all. It is very important to establish the supremacy of organizations. The Kurdish movement needs this.

Another important lesson for us to learn is that American imperialism is our enemy. Up to that time, only British and French imperialism were on the scene. After that, America also joined the enemy camp. It was seen clearly in the experiment of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic that the imperialist camp is the enemy of the Kurdish movement.

His utter defeat in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1975 showed us that Mullah Mustafa Barzani failed to learn anything about this stern lesson. He saw American imperialism as a friend instead of an enemy. And we all saw the painful result.

The interests of American imperialism required the absolute destruction of the Republic of Kurdistan. And they ultimately encouraged the shah in this regard. Otherwise, the shah could not have taken on such a risky business as destroying the Kurdish and Azerbaijani republics by himself.

Iraqi Kurdistan

[Question] Now let us get to Iraqi Kurdistan. We see that a party was also formed in Iraqi Kurdistan when the Mahabad Kurdish Republic was at its height. Would you explain briefly the developments from the formation of the party until the Kasim revolution in 1958 and the history of the party? In particular:

First, what was its policy?

Second, what kind of program did it have?

Third, what was the class and social status of the leadership cadres of the party?

Fourth, what classes supported the party, what classes had relations with it and what classes formed the party base?

Fifth, how were the party's relations with the Iraqi people, the Arabs and other minorities and their revolutionaries?

[Answer] I answered all these questions, or wrote about them, in my book. But there are two things I did not discuss at the time I was writing the book. Let me discuss them now. Let me discuss them first and then answer your questions briefly.

The first point is that the way the party formed, that is, the way the Kurdistan Democratic Party [KDP] was formed was a step backwards in my view. A party had

been formed in Iraqi Kurdistan named the Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party. This party led to the formation of another party, named Parti Rizgari Kurd (Kurdish Liberation Party), in order to have social effectiveness. Kurdish intellectual, youth, nationalists and patriots gathered under the banner of this party. The communists, however, took the communist party directly.

With the formation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the work of these two parties became confused. Everything was mixed up between them and, of course, this hurt the Kurdish Marxist-Leninists. Let me put it this way, if you pour a little acid into a bucket of water, it is the acid that will lose its punch. It becomes the same as water. The KDP-Iraq took the punch out of the Marxists by mixing everything up together.

We are not making this mistake today. The Kurdish Marxists establish and work through their own organizations. And they work in cooperation with the patriotic, revolutionary Kurdish forces.

Second, the KDP rebuilt the leadership of the Kurdish aghas and chieftains. This was a significant blow to the Kurdish movement. The roots of the heavy defeat in 1975 go back to them. That is, we experienced heavy losses in 1975 as the result of a mistake made back in 1946.

When the KDP was formed in Iraq in 1946, Mustafa Barzani was in Iran and did not even know about the organizations in Iraqi Kurdistan. The organizations we are talking about had been organized by Hamza Abdullah and some other people. Hamza Abdullah was the greatest Kurdish Marxist of the time. He was widely respected among the people. But he had conflicts with Ghazi Muhammed and this is why he wanted to strengthen Mullah Mustafa against Ghazi Muhammed.

[Question] What were the conflicts?

[Answer] I do not know exactly, but Ghazi Muhammed was said to have accused Hamza Abdullah of being a British agent. And Hamza Abdullah strengthened Mullah Mustafa because of the conflicts. He brought him in and made him chairman of the party. Until that time, Mullah Mustafa had not even been a member of either of the parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. After that, Mullah Mustafa controlled the party without too much difficulty and was himself the chairman. Shiekh Latif was deputy chairman and Sheikh Ziyad Muhammed was assistant deputy chairman. Another group of aghas came to the party and stuck like a burr. After these developments, straight Kurdish Marxists and revolutionaries deserted the party en masse and joined the Iraqi Communist Party. The Kurdish aghas and sheikhs began to control the movement. And the source of all this misfortune which our people suffered for 30 years, from 1946 to 1976, began there. The source of the mistakes began with restoring the aghas, mullahs, sheikhs and chieftains to leadership.

Barzani should have been seen as a national Kurdish personality. He should have been kept outside the party. Still, he should have been respected. But should a person have been brought to the head of the party who had no idea of what organization meant, who had never even once in his life been interested in these things or understood them?

After these things came to a head, the party lost its effectiveness. It existed in name only. In practice, it could do nothing. Party functionaries in all the places where the party was effective were relieved of their duties. The leading aghas of the regions were brought into replace them. In this way, the party was alienated from the political scene and a mechanism emerged to replace it in which the aghas were influential and made the decisions. The plan was clear--to render the party inoperable and ensure control of the Kurdish aghas. On the other hand, the party wanted the revolution under its own control. To do this, it established committees in the regions where there were independent peshmerge units composed of tribal forces and made an intensive effort to control the movement. But it was ineffectual despite this. Mullah Mustafa had been organizing the tribal forces, and he was opposed to the party. Not just to the party, but to the party idea. In his view, the party effort had been sowing seeds of discord among the Kurdish nation. Naturally such an understanding would be opposed to the party. For this reason, he formed tribal units outside the party and tried to run the movement with them. His opposition to the party reached the limit after 1962. That year Mullah Mustafa and his friends established relations with the United States. In these relations, established through the journalist Danna Adam Smiht [as published], America made it clear that it was not happy with the party, and especially the party's central committee and politburo, that they were Marxists. For this reason, the Kurdish movement was "suspect" and they could not aid it, they said. This was when Mullah Mustafa's hostility toward the party reached the limit. At first, Mullah Mustafa wanted to get rid of the party but, heeding someone's advice, he decided to put up with it. Someone told him, "If you get rid of the party, Ibrahim Ahmet, Jalal Talabani and Dr Shemzini will use it against you to bring the party ranks over to their side."

In short, the party existed, giving struggle, continuously.

[Question] Now we come to an important problem--the dimensions and causes of the conflict between you and Mustafa Barzani and the forms they took. Would you explain briefly the conflicts, especially up to 1966, and the forms they took?

[Answer] As I said, there was a concrete conflict between Barzani and the party. The party wanted the revolution under its own control, to direct it; Barzani wanted to take leadership of the revolution with the tribal forces. The party wanted the revolution to be a revolution of the workers, the peasants and the poor people and to assign them basic functions; Barzani wanted the tribal forces to be the basic force, especially the Barzani tribe, and wanted them to occupy the basic positions. We had a lot of similar conflicts.

After the coup against Kerim Kasim in 1963, Barzani openly took the front against the party, because war was close at that time and Barzani did not have the strength for it. Barzani reached agreement with Salam Arif in 1964. There was nothing to benefit the Kurds in the agreement. It was even worse than the announcements made in connection with the Kurds by the Iraqi state during the Baath period. The Baathists had used the term "Our brothers the Kurdish people" in their statements, but even this was not done in the new agreement. Barzani released a bulletin after the agreement was reached (his bulletin was published in the newspapers and broadcast on official radio), saying that the peshmerge must return to their homes.

After this happened, the units attached to Barzani attacked the headquarters where the party politburo was located. The politburo did not fight back. Instead of fighting, they fled to Iran and were arrested by the shah's troops in Iranian Kurdistan.

[Question] Would you expand a little, especially, on your flight to Iran and subsequent developments (and of course your reasons for going)? As you are one of the most important surviving witnesses of this incident, it would be useful to hear about it from you.

[Answer] Of course. I was going to explain it anyway.

The date was 1964. Barzani and his tribal forces made an all-out attack on the politburo headquarters. Ibrahim Ahmet was not there at the time. I was there with the late martyr Ali Askeri and the others. We realized that we could not repulse this attack, that it would be disastrous, and we decided that the best alternative was to go to Iran.

[Question] Where was Ibrahim Ahmed at that time?

[Answer] He had gone to Europe. When we went to Iran, the Iranian authorities came and said, "Either surrender your arms immediately or go back." So we crossed the Iranian border, but we only went a kilometer or two to the village of Betush. We were of two opinions at that time. One view was to go back to Iraq, establish a headquarters there and fight if Barzani units attacked. The other view was mine. I said, "Mullah Mustafa is not in the Barzan region himself at the moment. Let's go directly to the Barzan region to Sheikh Ahmet Barzani and then Mullah Mustafa cannot get at us." That was my view. But my colleagues did not accept it. So we went back to Iraq.

[Question] Who were the ones who did not accept your proposal?

[Answer] The late Ali Askeri, Hilmi Sherif, Omer Debabe and the others. So we went back to Iraq. We settled in the Sulkiye region, but Barzani sent his units after us. With Iraq's help, of course, Iraq was helping them, providing vehicles and sending supplies from the cities. Barzani had reached agreement with the government, deciding that the party should be abolished and the Kurds should stop fighting. The Iraqi government's greatest fear at that time was of the party itself.

When Barzani's units came after us, we had to fight back, but we were defeated. There was nothing for us to do but go back to Iran. We settled in a place close to the border. The Iranian authorities came to us and said that they would harbor us there on one condition. Their condition was that we not return to Iraq. They did not want us to go back to Iraq. We accepted this proposal.

This is where we came to Iran's plan. After a while, they came and said that the place where we were staying was not good and that we had to go to a better place. The place we went was a plain. They gave us tents and such and made sure we settled there. So they moved us some distance from the border and away from the mountains.

One night they came and said that we could not remain armed on Iranian territory and that we could either give up our arms and stay as political refugees or go back to Iraq. They also said that they had established relations with Barzani and that Barzani would permit us to return.

We said, "Okay, then we will establish relations with Barzani and if he gives us assurances that he will not attack us, we will return to Iraq."

[Question] We want to ask something here: Who were the Iranians who established and maintained contact with you? Were they direct spokesmen for the government, army spokesmen or SAVAK?

[Answer] It was Iranian officers who established and maintained contact with us. Their spokesman was a Kurd named Ferruh Niyar. So they told us through this officer that they had established relations with Barzani, that Barzani was in the Gilala region, that they would take us as far as Haci Omran by car and that we could sit down and talk with Barzani there. We agreed to this. But they also said that we could not go anywhere within the borders of Iran as long as we were armed, that we could place our weapons in one or two large trucks, that our peshmerge would guard these weapons and that the rest of us (400 to 500 at that time) could take military vehicles and go to Haci Omran quietly at night.

We got in the military vehicles and set out one night. They took us to the military garrison at Sakiz. They said that we would eat there and then leave for Mahabad and go from there to Haci Omran. They took us inside the military garrison. We were surrounded by thousands of armed soldiers. We did not have our weapons with us. They said we would spend the night there.

The next morning, they told us that we were going to stay there now, that we could not go anywhere. They also seized our weapons.

After a while, they established contact with Barzani. When Barzani said that we could not stay in Iranian Kurdistan, they took us to Hamedan, a city near Tehran.

When we found out that Iran was going to hold us there, we objected. We went and talked to the authorities. We said that we wanted to go back to Iraq, that we were going back at any cost, that we would go to the Iraqi embassy and surrender if necessary and that Iraq could kill us if it wanted to, but it would be better than staying here. They did not agree. We started a hunger strike. After two or three days, they came and saw that it was serious. They said that they definitely would not permit me to return to Iraq, but I could go to Europe if I wanted to. I had my passport and I went to Europe, to West Germany.

I stayed there for about a year. The other colleagues stayed on for a year in Iran. When war began again in Iraqi Kurdistan, when Iraq attacked Kurdistan again, we returned to Kurdistan. We went to Barzani and told him that his policy was wrong, that Iraq had given up no rights at all and it had done no good to stop the struggle. We made an alliance with Barzani. But he scattered our units. We agreed to this.

He put me, Nuri Shawez, Nuri Taha, Ali Askeri, Omer Debabe and Hilmi Sherif in a region at the back. We said "Okay" to this also. One of our colleagues, a member of the central committee named Ali Hamdi, had been captured by Barzani's troops. We requested that he be released. They were always saying, "Today," "Tomorrow." After a while, they told us that our friend had died. Also, according to information conveyed to us by some of our friends, plans were being made to kill us too.

According to the agreement we had reached with Barzani, we were supposed to be able to work actively politically after three months. We were to operate as a party and establish an alliance with Barzani's party. We were to work as two parties. Three months, six months passed and the decision still had not been made so that we could begin our work. On the contrary, plans had been made to get rid of us. The decision for our death had been made. A decision was issued, signed by Barzani himself, which said, "Everyone found and proved to belong to Ibrahim Ahmet and Jalal Talabani's party should be put to death." Not just captured, but killed. I still have this document. They killed our colleague Ali Hamdi. They murdered another group of our colleagues. We remained. Reports were coming to us every day. One day, three of Barzani's men brought us a written report. The report said that "Idris Barzani" wanted to see me and Hilmi Sherif. A person who had worked in the party before and was a regional commander at that time had told Ali Askeri that a death decision lay behind the report and that we would be killed if we went.

[Question] Do you remember this person's name?

[Answer] No, I do not remember. Ali Askeri had known him well. We decided not to go. Six of us decided among ourselves not to go, but to escape. Four of us, Hilmi Sherif, Ali Askeri, Omer Debabe and myself escaped. Ali Askeri went to Kirkuk, Omer Debabe and I went to Suleymaniyah and Hilmi Sherif went to Baghdad to begin operating underground. Our goal was to conduct political activity, to protect and develop our force. After a while, we learned that Barzani was again about to make a pact with the Iraqi government. His purpose was again to make an agreement directed against us. Exactly as in 1964.

At that time (1966), Abdulsellam Arif was in power in Iraq. And he was a friend of Nasser. We sent one of our colleagues (Hilmi Sherif) to Egypt to see Nasser. We had friendly relations with Nasser. We were thinking that he could be helpful in resolving the Kurdistan problems in Iraq. We explained our situation to him. Nasser did not want war in Iraq. It was his view that the war should be ended with the Kurds getting their due. He pointed out that it was necessary for us to try to end the war and get the Kurds together with the Iraqi government. In this way, he said we would be able to create the conditions for a change of power in Iraq. The purpose was understood to be realization of a change of power in Iraq through a junta. He also had many men in the army. He said that when the administration changed, the Kurds would have full rights. This was a proposal which we also found appropriate.

Abdurrahman Bazzaz was prime minister in Iraq at that time. Abdurrahman Bazzaz established relations both with Barzani and with us and advanced the need for us to agree with the Iraqi government. We agreed to this.

We made a big mistake here. We should not have accepted the Iraqi government's request for talks. We should have rejected this request. We should have let Barzani talk with them and, if he had obtained partial rights, we would have come into those rights, too. But, as I said, we made an important mistake and established relations with the Iraqi government.

We had only one fear, that Barzani would reach agreement with Iraq, catching us in the crossfire, totally annihilating us. This was what influenced us to enter relations with Iraq. We should have been content just to strengthen our own political efforts after all. We were holding a few regions. We should have tried to create conditions for a broader struggle there. We should have done this instead of establishing relations with Iraq.

8349

CSO: 4654/66

EMPHASIS GIVEN TO EDUCATION

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 5

[Text]

Two Iraqi ministers were relieved of their portfolios last week and appointed to posts as advisers to the country's Revolutionary Command Council, the highest authority in Iraq. Hazem Mohammed Khalaf was replaced as Minister for Higher Education and Scientific Research by Abdel Razzak Kasem al-Hashemi and Abdel Jabbar Abdel Majid gave up his post as Minister of Education to Abdel Kader Ezzidin as the result of two decrees issued on July 26 by President Saddam Hussein.

No reason was given for the minor reshuffle. It could, however, signal greater emphasis on education in Iraq. The budgets for these two ministries have risen steadily in recent years, but the proportion of the overall budget allocated to them has decreased slightly between 1979 and 1981. The latest moves could mean that this trend will be reversed in line with the government's avowed policy of pushing ahead vigorously with development projects despite the 10-month-old war with Iran.

Budgetary allocations for education and research (1979-81) (in millions of Iraqi Dinars*)						
	1979		1980		1981	
	ID	% of total budget	ID	% of total budget	ID	% of total budget
Ministry of Education	75.4	2.9	108.8	2.9	140.3	2.8
Ministry of Higher Education	70.8	2.6	102.0	2.8	123.9	2.47

* ID 1 = \$3.88 at the current exchange rate.

CABINET MEMBER MERIDOR'S BACKGROUND DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Aug 81 p 4

[Article by F.C.: 'M Ya'agov Meridor: A Flamboyant Capitalist']

[Text] What a strange fellow is this man, suddenly called back less than 6 months ago to the political scene by Mr Begin, to be named, to everyone's surprise, his right arm in the immediate future and his eventual successor. Why such an unexpected choice, when Ya'agov Meridor, after a cautious career in Parliament, had retired 12 years ago in order to devote himself entirely to his increasingly lucrative business affairs?

One can judge how limited were the choices from the fact that he is a man who is really a little old for an heir apparent. Meridor is 68 years old, like the prime minister, to whom he has endeared himself by proven loyalty since 1943, when he turned over to him his functions as commander of the Irgun, the clandestine extremist organization which had declared war on the British occupying power.

Meridor today has one of the largest fortunes in Israel. Among other things he heads a maritime transport company specializing in refrigerated shipments, one of the biggest in the world, and a fleet of tankers that have led Begin to call him affectionately "my Onassis." The arrival of this flamboyant capitalist is obviously worrisome to the laborites, who fear the second Begin government will seek the development of a "privatization" of statal and para-statal enterprises.

Meridor has already set the example by recently buying back--in company with some South African investors--a big construction company belonging to the Jewish Agency. Meridor the businessman is also a patriot. He showed it during the 1973 war by putting his ships at the disposal of the state for the emergency transport of 28,000 tons of arms and munitions supplied by the United States, and, previously, by allowing some of his companies to serve occasionally as a cover for activities of the secret services.

Though a shrewd financier, he has also had several grandiose projects go down to resounding defeat, which led some to doubt his capability and judgment, and somewhat embarrassed his friends. When he was established in Ethiopia, did he not suggest the idea of "drying up" Nasser's Egypt and forcing it to make peace by diverting the waters of the Blue Nile? Quite recently, just before the elections,

Mr Meridor announced with great hub-bub that some of his scientists had just discovered a new and very mysterious method of producing energy from plant-based gases, which, he said, "will force the Arabs to drink their oil and give Chancellor Schmidt, Mrs Thatcher and President Mitterrand the chance to quit their bootlicking." To hear him talk, it is "the greatest invention since the wheel," said the Laborites with some amusement. It is a fact that for more than a month now since the elections, Meridor has not spoken any more about his revolutionary invention. He lost a good deal of his reputation as a young innocent in that venture.

9516

CSO: 4319/6

NEW KFAED LOANS CITED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 8

[Text]

The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has announced new loans worth a total of \$142.3 million to six Asian and African countries, including Zimbabwe for the first time. The loans are for between 20 to 40 years and carry interest varying from 1.5 to 4 per cent annually.

Zimbabwe received the first \$29 million tranche from a total credit of \$54 million to finance improvement work for its railways (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, March 30). According to the loan announcement in Kuwait, the 17-year loan will cover 96 per cent of the scheme's total cost.

The loan has a three-year grace period and is at 3.5 per cent annual interest, plus a 0.5 per cent service charge.

About \$3.5 million has been earmarked for one of the poorest Islamic states, the Comoro Islands, to finance a telecommunications project. The loan is for 40 years, carries 1 per cent interest and an administrative fee of 0.5 per cent. It has a 10-year grace period.

This is the first KFAED loan to the Comoros, which has so far this year benefited from \$5.5 million in aid, through two credits from the Islamic Development Bank

(IDB) to finance oil purchases from Kuwait (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 4 and January 19).

Bangladesh gets one of the largest of the KFAED loans, with \$28.44 million to finance the drilling of Artesian wells, which will irrigate 150,000 acres of agricultural land. The project is expected to relieve the country's acute food shortage, the loan announcement said, and lessen its dependence on food imports.

Samalia receives a comparable amount, \$28.77 million, for an irrigation project in Mogambo. When completed in 1986, the project will irrigate an area of 2,200 hectares on the west bank of the Juba river around Mogambo. The total cost of the project is estimated at \$42.2 million.

Indonesia has been allocated \$37.8 million to finance the country's Greater Bandung Power Distribution Project. Construction of the \$65.8 million project is to start next year and is scheduled for completion in 1984.

Finally, KFAED has also granted Pakistan \$14.68 million to finance a rural electrification project in the province of Baluchistan. The scheme is to provide power to 300 villages for domestic use and for small development projects such as water pumping and light industries.

QADHDHAFI'S GREEN BOOK ANALYZED

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[Article by Jean-Paul Charnay: "Qadhdhafism"]

[Text] Muammar Qadhdhafi has tried to go beyond traditionally structured fundamentalist doctrines and articulate both the religious absolute and the laws of history. Without going over his ultimate geopolitical and geostrategic aims, we will try here to identify the concepts of religion and of human and social nature elaborated in the "Green Book" and several other texts.

Many thinkers in all civilizations have considered the world and history as intellectually and morally shameful subjects: "In practice, it is always the strong who rule." ("Green Book," I concl.) Agonizing over injustice leads one to search for a remedy, but also to ask oneself whether it was always this way. Like many other minds, Muammar Qadhdhafi has thus embarked on this quest, for his people and for humanity, in a universe which oscillates between the harshness of the anti-imperialist struggle and the ambivalences of economic development which threatens to erode the moral and social equilibrium without which, he says, man could not retain his dignity as a creation of God. For unlike many Islamic leaders who keep the faith in their hearts, yet also unlike the fundamentalists who only offer the literal application of the canonical institutions in a world where it would be difficult to apply them, he is trying, from canonical and anthropological basis provided by the Koran, to construct a moral, social, political, and economic architecture which answers to the needs not only of Muslim societies but of our time.

As a believing Muslim, he cannot accept that the creation was "evil" from the start; in and for Evil in its full human, ethical, and theological meaning. This produces a dialectic rather unusual in Arab-Muslim thought, which tries to blend a religious orientation with a certain concept of the "state of nature." This category which is simultaneously anthropological, moral, and political, intended to account for the evolution, organization, and operation of social groups--the "state of nature" has in the West served as the starting point for many constructions of rights and theology, social criticism and political philosophy: this state of nature varying from a totally pessimistic one (for Hobbes man is his own predator) to the idyllic conception of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

The predominant Arab-Muslim theological tradition was to the contrary obliged, by the historic event of the Koranic Revelation, to another duality, that between the pagan era, the jahiliya, pejoratively viewed, and the Moslem era of restored innocence. The reference to a "state of nature" was therefore often hidden by the normative description resulting from the law delivered by means of the latest and greatest of the prophets, Muhammad. There remained only the problem of determining whether good and evil were good and evil by themselves, in themselves, "by nature," or because God had decided so. Those who adhered to the first opinion were accused by those who adhered to the second of denying the omnipotence of God. And, in fact, Arab philosophers who used the term "state of nature" presented it as a rather pessimistic conception. Not as pessimistic as that of Hobbes, for whom that state is one of an absolute war of all against all, but a state which social organization and community life must inevitably corrupt, rigidify by formalistic rules (Ibn Tofail) or turn into a state that is the opposite of a refined civilization (Ibn Khaldun).

For Ibn Tofail (Abubacer, 12th century) Hayy ben Yaqdhan (the Living Person: created man, child of the Vigilant One: God), left as a babe on a desert island, reaches the highest philosophical and moral concepts, through the interaction of the natural predilections of his soul and the world which surrounds him (experience), but once having discovered life in society falls away from it. For Ibn Khaldun (14th century) the cyclical rhythm of human societies is marked by the apogees of dynasties which subdue tribes and build a civilizing empire, but the refinement of the latter leads to degradation, corruption, and the fall of the civilization to an inferior level, to a state of nature, or anxious struggle for survival inhibits the development of security and thought.

This is a contradiction from which Muammar Qadhdhafi is trying to escape. The creation, emanating from God, must be good, as must also be the manner in which it has been regulated by successive Revelations: this is a traditional finding of all Muslim theology. The problem for Muammar Qadhdhafi is thus to find those factors destructive of the original harmony. Far from contrasting the impurity of the jahiliya with the purity of the Muslim era, as most theologians do, he looks in the Koran for the explanation of the course of civilization and its deviations from it. According to the Koran, in effect, humanity was created divided into two ethnocultural groups: "We made you as peoples and tribes in order that you should understand each other. Not for you to kill each other." The state of nature consists of one difference: "Nationalism thus existed before the appearance of religion." ("Discourse on Religion and Nationalism," 5, moharram 1398, 8 February 1973, French publication: "General Information Administration," p 18.). But conversely, at the beginning, religion was in a primordial, universal, and undifferentiated stage: "The great principles of humanity were born before any theories." ("Opening Speech at the International Congress of European and Arab Youth," 11 rabi II, 1393 [Muslim Era], 14 May 1973, published in French: "General Information Board, Ministry of Information and Culture," p 5.). Thus, Islam "in its divine conception" signifies the "true" religion. It is larger than the Islamic religion in the historical sense of the term; it not only concerns the "Muslims" who, strictly speaking, have only existed since the Hegira ("Religion and Nationalism," p 11) but all men who since the creation of Adam (and "all human beings are descendents of Adam," "Youth," p 6) have believed in one God; and particularly the great prophets from Ibrahim (Abraham) to Muhammad, including Jesus-Issa, to whom God expressly said "Be Muslim" and who was not at all a polytheist but adhered strictly to hanifism, the original, primordial, natural religion.

Thus Jews and Christians were originally only Muslims ("Religion and Nationalism," p 17). And even today, "what does it matter if one is Muslim or not, the important thing is that you believe in God and that you believe in all the prophets from first to last," ("Youth," p 25.). However, this presupposes that one accepts the prophetic mission of Mahomet.

This concept thus implicitly incorporates one of the great notions of Muslim theology, the notion of fit'ra, a sort of innate disposition of the human being to perceive the essential truths of divinity and creation, particularly the worship of one God. "The most pious among you is in God's eyes the best," ("Youth," p 57): the most honorable.

From the state of nature of humanity (divided into peoples) and that of religion (pre-existing the Koranic Revelation and belief in God) thus emerges the ethical and individual state of nature, a state consisting in a balanced life in the bosom of one's own people, respectful of other peoples.

But "Adam is of the earth," ("Youth," p 6) and his passions, his instincts, become the institutions which constitute the natural order: nationalism and religion. And their deviations, like their reappropriation to struggle against those deviations, will be precisely what drives "the engines of history"--will constitute the "movement of history," made up of advance and recession, of a perpetual struggle between good and evil, of a permanent straining not to return to their original form but to achieve their legitimate functioning in the world of today.

This structure of ideas thus integrates psychological, political, and economic factors. Laterally to the famous definitions of the nation by Renan (collective will to live) or Stalin (a historically constituted community of people having the same language, territory, economic life, and psychological and cultural formation), Qadhdhafi asserts: "Setting aside blood ties, the nation is in a word a feeling of belongingness and a communal destiny" ("Green Book," III). A very interesting proposition, for it does not refer to either of the two traditionally fundamental ties: Arab genealogy (so powerful in the family, the tribe, the glorification of common ancestors) and religious cohesion. By contrast, it emphasizes a historic and voluntarist teleology: the communal destiny.

But how do deviations and debasements appear? For God permitted and intended the harmonious differentiation of humanity into nations. But within each nation, other oppositions have come to light: each tribe, sect, group, party, and class pursuing its own particular interests to the detriment of the others, and aiming at absolute domination over the whole of society. This leads to the creation and expansion of an institution, the "apparatus of government," to the advantage of only a part of that society. This seizing of absolute power first destabilizes internal relationships, then international relationships: for the class or faction in power is going to increase its exploitative activity against the others: from a unifying force, nationalism becomes an aggressive force ("Youth," p 11). It also produces a debasement of the law, by enacting purely human and partisan constitutions and statutes to provide ideological justification for and to maintain its power. The law is in turn warped, like the nation, out of the state of nature ("Green Book," I, p 66).

Thus, both prior to and beyond the universalism of religion, the differentiation of nations is recognized, and thus the necessity of an international order to regulate their relations. But the nation is of a social nature, immediate and natural like the family, while international institutions are of a political nature, and thus subject to the phenomena of conflict and destruction. Thus Qadhdhafi's ideological critique emerges to demystify the modification of the natural order, both from the political and economic point of view.

From the political standpoint, he denounces representative elections and referenda validating the insidious dictatorship of parties ("the tribes and sects of the contemporary world", "Green Book," I, p 33). From the economic point of view, he denounces the profit motive, which going beyond the legitimate satisfaction of needs entails a private accumulation of capital.

Now the brutal or insidious dictatorship of parties, just like slavery to money, is contrary to the state of nature and to natural law. Qadhdhafi's theory at this point intermixes anthropological and theological elements.

"As man is everywhere the same, so his morphology and instincts are everywhere the same...natural law (natural order) has become the logical law of man," (ibid., p 69) and religious law, "religion, absorbs custom (tradition, the natural order), which is the expression of the natural life of the people. So then religion is the confirmation of natural law" (Ibid., p 74) and reflects the natural state of primordial religion.

Now in this state of nature, every man is both free and aware of his responsibilities to himself (his own welfare) and to others. Neither encroaches on the other. This is why Muslim religious law (the Koranic revelation), sure of the dignity of man, of his capacity for managing his own affairs, decrees so few material penalties (only those indispensable to the protection of life in society; the others postponed to the day of the Last Judgment) and provides so many recommendations and guidelines intended to guide man toward the good. "The law is the criterion for distinguishing the just from the unjust, the true from the false, as well as the rights of individuals and their duties," ("Green Book," I, p 71-73). And this is because the law refers back to and confirms that state of nature in which humanity lived in the first days of creation, which explains why unlike other religions Islam is much less a coercive normative system than a "system of definitions and purification." In any case, the relationships between natural law and religious law are very different from those offered by Christianity. According to Saint Thomas Aquinas who provided one of the most complete elaborations, it is quite the opposite: it is divine law from which, by rigorous deduction, natural law is derived; and then the laws effectively applicable in and between human societies are in turn derived, by induction and accommodation with the practical law decreed by sovereigns, from natural law.

Such a theory would doubtless seem dangerous to Qadhdhafi, for the exacerbation of the phenomenon of nationalism could exploit and degrade formulations of religious law. Thus the system undoes itself. Thus Jews and Christians at various times have distorted the Scriptures ("Youth," p 39) and have used them to pursue an aggressive nationalism. Thus new "ideologues" such as Mao or Lenin ("Religion and Nationalism," p 21) or technology ("Youth," p 31) can arise which, if not kept in bounds, lead to the work of Satan: atomic weapons, intercontinental missiles (ibid, p 15). The works of Satan culminate in the usurpation and exploitation of the wealth of other peoples: it is the ultimate negation of human dignity and equality.

From this conception of the state of nature, Qadhdhafi rigorously deduces the strategic consequences. The struggle against dictatorial government should not be carried out on a class against class basis. For if it were victorious, it would inherit the contradictions of the society, would fragment and reproduce the same class oppositions ("Green Book," I, p 41).

There remains then propulsion of the whole of society by means of violence and legitimate revolution, but this cannot be carried out without running the risk that the active individuals and minorities involved in the struggle may in turn fall into despotism and bureaucracy. Similarly, in foreign policy, positive neutralism must be respected by all nations, but it must also maintain special vigilance toward those which appear to give signs of aggressive nationalism: in other words signs of a tendency to imperialism and exploitation of others.

These strategic principles do not bar condemnation of any Realpolitick, whether it derive from the unbridled natural order or from religious law. For the believer, fear of God obliges respect of others, and respect for promises made. For other policies, this respect only derives from fear of reprisals, which entails the concept of a policy motivated solely by the play of antagonistic social forces, a game which can only favor the success of the great imperialistic powers ("Youth," p 37-38).

Consequently, for and by virtue of Islam, of course, but also out of concern for "natural" humanity, between men and peoples, Qadhdhafi reacts against what he believes he sees in worlds external to him, and which appear to him to be contrary to human nature and to the social state of nature: the hedonistic materialism of western capitalism leading the lost soul from solitude to moral disorder, to the taking of narcotics, to suicide, and which forces him to break the law to achieve safety in numbers (labor organizations); the brutal idolatry of the state found in communism, which reduces man, the slave of the governmental apparatus, to violating the law to survive ("Youth," p 48 and 53-54).

So, as between capitalism and communism, while humanity undergoes "the passage from the era of republics to the era of the masses," (Green Book," I, 22), and while John Paul II--though reaffirming dogma--preaches a Christian humanism that goes beyond Catholicism, Muammar Qadhdhafi offers a "third international path," which calls for the formation of a society of affiliated socialist producers, organized in economic terms on the basis of limiting private property to the enjoyment of only those goods that are indispensable to human life; replacement of wage-earning, the sale of manpower (which remains a form of slavery in spite of all social measures) by participation in the fruits of production in proportion to his contribution to one of the three major factors of production (raw materials, means of production-energy, labor); reduction of savings to individual nonconsumption; and rejection of money as an instrument of capitalization and exploitation. In political terms, it would be organized on the basis of a combination of congresses (to deliberate) and people's committees (to implement) in neighborhoods and industries, eliminating the apparatus of government and administrative fortresses; unique occupational problems being resolved by specialized trade unions. For real democracy consists not in some particular governmental or electoral procedure but in the fact that the entire group is responsible for itself and has become its own proctor. ("Green Book," I, pp 75-76). The press, the mass media, must therefore remain the general expression of the people's will, and the media in turn must make the society transparent to itself, must be the instruments for the conscious autonomy of the masses (Jamahiriya).

This economic and political theory, perhaps more communitarian, interdependence-oriented and populist than socialistic in the strict sense, coexists with the determination to secure autonomy and the personalization of daily life. Every family should own its own house, a means of transportation: the accumulation, thus the concentration, of its wealth would establish dominance relationship between individuals, which would be contrary to human freedom. Similarly, natural dignity demands the end of the status of "domestic help" and its replacement by that of a wage-earner specializing in the general chores of maintenance and cleaning.

Carried to its logical conclusion, beyond the collectivist system of production which produces a surplus of wealth, a system of self-sufficient farms should be superposed, permitting the family to live, not in strict autarky, but out of range of the sudden surges and abatements in the supply system that is more or less connected with the international market. The structure induced by this system no longer presupposes the big patriarchal family, but a sort of paternal nuclear family.

Thus we see the concerns which are also coming to light in a number of Arab countries: the determination, by means of family cells intermediate between the traditional family and the conjugal family of the West, to stabilize on the land a demographic fabric that will not ineluctably drain off toward the urban coastal areas, one which is capable of resisting the avatars of industrial development and the vagaries of world prices.

For a population such as Libya's, the major part of which lived in a nomadic state, such prospects refer less to the idea of a "return to the land" than to the transposition of the old natural order: human nature in the family context, physical nature still close to the rhythms of the seasons and the crops which, beyond the banks of the Syrtes, were still confined to oases. The development of the land beyond Benghazi is significant in that regard.

In this theory, various elements appear. Some arise from the Arab-Muslim formulations of socialism and neutralism, and from the concern of rulers to channel the demographic growth perceived as an expansion of the Muslim community and as strategic offensive factor in the re-establishment of global economic balance, in a new distribution of wealth. Others arise from the traditional sociopolitical ethos of the Muslim city: the regulation of community life by all of its members, evoking the theory of the *hisba* by virtue of which order and morality rest on the every individual's vigilance. Affirmation of its oneness and rejection or elision of divisions into classes and sects, an affirmation which even penetrates into economic specialization: the division of labor being recognized as indispensable but of only technical significance, secondary to the participation of each individual in production, and its permeation of the two ultimate "natural" institutions: the family, where the duties of each member are traditionally ascribed, and the nation. Nostalgia for a better past where a society in equilibrium remained true to itself, in a state of cultural and historic splendor, while at the same time attending to individual needs, but also the determination through collective effort to transpose that splendor and equilibrium to the modern world.

To do this, Qadhdhafi sketches out a philosophy of history and a dialectic of good and evil and bases his pragmatic revolutionary struggle against any abuses of power on concepts he derives from Koranic anthropology: a natural differentiation not

by class but by peoples, a differentiation harmonized by a guiding, natural and universal law which was formalized by the Revelation of the Hegira. The religious reference reveals his intent to build a theory adapted to our times, not as a new humanistic philosophy--thus a changeable one, subject to national contingencies--but on a permanent, unique, and eternal truth: that natural law which Islam has embraced, which the Revelation has confirmed and certified for the faithful, but which in its origins transcends the historically Islamized peoples and has value for all humanity divided into its various peoples.

Thus one can see the originality of Qadhdhafi's intellectual journey. Far from re-creating by logic a state of nature from which the existing social order would derive through improvement or deterioration, he searches within law which appeared subsequently, at a historically known and definite moment, the elements of that state of nature, and tries to offer a transposition adapted to our time.

By his religious orientation Qadhdhafi wants to re-establish the primal innocence of human realtions, a conscious society where relations will be determined not by constraint but by self-regulation of behavior and harmonious satisfaction of needs, a society in which man, happy in the bosom of his family, his country, and his culture, having an internalized ethos and his external needs satisfied, will finally attain happiness. In this attempt perhaps lies the most original contribution of his thought; in any case it is the most respectable.

Of course, methodologically and philosophically, many questions arise.

From the theological point of view, it would be necessary to explore more deeply the previous theories relative to the realtionships between natural law and religion and to examine them in light of current historical, exegetical and ethnological knowledge.

From a historical standpoint, it would be necessary to diversify interpretive systems: to assimilate the conflict between North and South Yemen to a religious conflict between Zeidites and Chafeites; to portray the conflict between Syria, which still bears the imprint of the Ommeyyades, and Iraq, which still bears that of the Abbassides, as essentially a national one; or even to describe as religious in nature India's partition in 1947 and as national that of Pakistan from Bangladesh in 1971, is too schematic to be credible.

From the anthropological point of view, it would be necessary to try to determine whether social frameworks other than the people or the tribe--tribe currently suffering from a pejorative connotation and being transposed into the notion of nation, a modern meliorative notion: the danger of anachronism is great. And it would also be necessary to see whether anthropologies arising from other systems of civilization--by the differentiated status of the productive forces, and by contemporary social and cultural stratifications--could easily be correlated with the natural state-primordial religion which is supposed to be transposed into its own society under existing conditions.

From a comparative point of view, it can be noted that the manner in which the "Green Book" perceives the values and structures of the West is the way in which they are represented by the media, with no profound vision of their revolution. It would also

be necessary to try to determine to what degree contemporary examples have influenced the doctrines of the "Green Book," validated at the same time by efforts to correlate them with other Islamic parallels. From the political point of view, still others are posed:

1. the problem of knowing whether the nation, the people, constitute a relevant structure in relation to the predictable evolution of the international community, which is increasingly hemmed in by economic interdependence and by the aspirations of the masses for higher standards of living;
2. the problem of the relationships, in ideology, in culture, and in international law, between the Arab nation as an entity and the various Arab states and regions. From a doctrinal point of view, the "third international path" postulates the withering away of the "apparatus of government"--but history continues to confirm the tendency for bureaucracy to be re-established. Especially since (this is corollary to the withering away of the state) the withering away of the law cannot be applied to religious law itself. Here we are enmeshed in complex theological, juridical, ethical, and psychological problems.

From the sociological and cultural point of view, it would be necessary to determine the consequences of expanded education and the psychological and economic changes produced in feminine psychology by the expansion of the female work force in the production system and women's possession of independent incomes, in order better to estimate the relevance of the proposed family structure.

From the economic point of view, finally, it would be necessary to determine the conditions for participation described as "natural" but which in practice runs up against the complexities of technological, financial, banking, and fiscal systems, against fluctuations and dominating positions in international trade, etc.

But basically questions of method and erudition remain peripheral to the grand design--to Qadhdhafi's great religious, political, and strategic challenge to imperialism and materialism: his formulation--and carrying into action by his faith--of a theory which legitimates his actions and can be a model, hope, and inspiration for all peoples ("Presentation at the De-Gaulle-Nasser Colloquium," Benghazi, 1975). Right from the start, the anthropological assertion of the preexistence (historically, not spiritually of course) of the nation before religion enables him to justify the fact that all Arabs, whether Muslim or Christian, "are putting their effort into Arab nationalist movements," ("Religion and Nationalism," p 19) and his passionate desire to create a nation that would transcend Libya, a nation with a coherent and complete social structure, through his unions with Tunisia, Egypt, and now Syria, in order to marshal against petro-dollars the historical alliance of the middle class and intellectuals in those countries which alone could make possible the organizing of a political structure (the neo-Hegelian dream) worthy of the name...We know what that was.

This similarly explains that push toward sub-Sahara, toward that Sahelian zone where once extended great black Muslim warrior empires, where today deposits of uranium are beginning to be exploited, and behind which both Algeria and Egypt are also hovering. This also explains the missionary assistance and cultural bureaus, the efforts at political action in Uganda, in Central Africa, the recognition of the POLISARIO and the successful establishment in Chad, a step by step advance into the

center of Africa. This also explains why this Islamic-Christian dialogue may be in part intended to counter-balance Soviet support. This also explains his reinterpretation of Islam in a simple style and on the basis of a few simple notions, doubtless sincere but also having geopolitical implications, an interpretation which sometimes puts him at odds with traditional theologians, with the aim of capturing the support of the Arab and African masses, and to catch the over-westernized intellectuals and the middle classes that are overly concerned with their standard of living.

This explains this short "Green Book" which is intended to play the role of those short and forceful texts which made their influence felt over more than half of humanity: the "Manifesto of the Communist Party" and the little "Red Book"...And this explains what he has done over the last few months, at Benghazi, Madrid, Paris,... mixing faith and propaganda, Macchiavellian strategy and the hope--perhaps utopian--of a new humanity, and along with practical politics*, those many meetings with intellectuals from East and West to consolidate the conceptual elaboration and the international endorsement of the "Green Book."

*On the geopolitical and geostrategic implications, cf. our studies: "The Islamic-Christian Dialogue: An Essay in Psycho-Strategic Interpretation: in POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 1976, No 3, p 219; and "Geopolitical Dreams and Realities in Middle Africa," STRATEGIQUE, Third Quarter, 1980, No 7, p 7.

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